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RESISTING REGULATION WITH BLUE RIBBON 
PANELS 
Thomas O. McGarity*
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern health, safety, and environmental regulations rely heavily on 
scientific information.  Consequently, disputes over the reliability of 
scientific studies, the proper interpretation of scientific data, and the 
inferences that may appropriately be drawn from an existing body of 
scientific information arise with great regularity as agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) go about their day-to-day business of implementing protective 
regulatory statutes.1  These disputes typically raise issues of such mind-
numbing complexity that they are virtually incomprehensible to agency 
decision makers who generally lack scientific training in the specific areas 
of scientific knowledge that those disputes invoke.  Decision makers must 
therefore rely upon scientists who are familiar with the relevant research to 
assess the quality of the scientific studies, interpret the scientific data, and 
define the range of proper conclusions that can be drawn from the data.  At 
the same time, however, the existing body of scientific information is rarely 
sufficient, by itself, to dictate a “scientifically correct” resolution of such 
disputes, and regulatory decisions necessarily turn on both scientific 
information and regulatory policy.2
 
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
  Regulatory decision makers therefore 
face the daunting task of resolving scientific disputes, defining where the 
science stops and where the policymaking begins, and determining the 
content of the policy that must necessarily fill the gaps left by incomplete 
 1. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 
207 (1990); WENDY WAGNER, RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (forthcoming 2006); 
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade In Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1613, 1639-40 (1995). 
 2. Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative 
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 
GEO. L.J. 729, 732-49 (1979); Wagner, supra note 1, at 1619. 
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or inadequate scientific information. 
One tried and true decision-making aid in this context is the “blue ribbon 
panel,” which is composed of neutral experts charged with answering 
specific questions that have been carefully crafted to limiting the panel’s 
input to scientific issues while leaving the policymaking to agency decision 
makers.3  The relevant agency can either appoint the blue ribbon panel on 
its own or contract with an outside body, like the National Research 
Council of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS), to assemble the 
panel and oversee its deliberations.  In fact, Congress frequently requires 
agencies to enter into such contracts with NAS to address especially 
controversial scientific issues.4
Because science plays such a prominent role in the regulatory process, 
and because the science is invariably contestable, the entities that regularly 
participate in that process have a strong incentive to present the existing 
body of scientific information to the agency in a way that advances their 
preferred regulatory outcomes.  One way for a regulated entity to 
accomplish this result is to assemble its own “blue ribbon panel,” populate 
it with scientists who are likely to resolve disputes consistently with the 
regulated entity’s preferred policies, charge the panel with questions that 
encompass both science and policy, and subtly attempt to influence the 
outcome of the panel’s deliberations.
  When such panels can achieve consensus, 
their reports can be very useful to the agency, both for the information that 
they provide, and for the legitimacy that they can lend to the agency’s 
ultimate decision.  Because the “blue ribbon panel” approach is time-
consuming and expensive, it is not appropriate for every regulatory action 
involving science, but it is ideal for especially contentious scientific 
disputes that otherwise tend to paralyze regulatory decision-making. 
5  The panel members are paid 
generous honoraria or are hired as consultants, and they are flown, all 
expenses paid, to commodious locations for their periodic meetings.6
 
 3. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACHIEVING CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER: THE REPORT 
OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OXEGENATES IN GASOLINE (1999), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/fuels/oxypanel/r99021.pdf. 
  The 
staff support that the regulated entity provides to the panel creates a built-in 
mechanism by which it can shape the panel’s deliberations.  Scientists from 
 4. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d) (2000) (providing for referral of “questions of scientific fact” 
by the hearing examiner to a committee of the National Academy of Sciences). 
 5. Although public interest groups have the same incentive to assemble blue ribbon 
panels, they generally lack the resources to pay the scientists for their time and travel and to 
provide staff support to such panels.  Therefore, the technique has generally been employed 
by regulated entities, rather than representatives of the beneficiaries of regulation. 
 6. See, e.g., ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH 109-10, 119 (2001) (noting 
that an expert panelist for manufacturer of Fen-phen was paid $5000 per day plus expenses). 
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the regulated entities are made available to offer input and advice, but the 
meetings are otherwise typically private affairs.7
This Article will explore the use and abuse of “blue ribbon panels” by 
regulated entities in regulatory decision-making involving contested 
scientific issues.  Part II of the Article will present a case study of one 
company’s use of such a panel to avoid more stringent regulation of the 
manufacture of the metal beryllium.  Drawing on the beryllium case study 
and other examples gleaned from news reports and the literature, Part III 
will explore the implications of widespread use of this technique for fair 
and effective health, safety, and environmental decision-making.  Finally, 
Part IV will offer some suggestions for how regulatory agencies should 
approach industry-sponsored blue ribbon panels. 
 
II. THE BERYLLIUM BLUE RIBBON PANEL 
Beryllium is an extremely light, but exceedingly strong metal that is 
used in a variety of consumer goods ranging from cell phones and golf 
clubs to dental fixtures.8  Because the primary use for beryllium in its early 
years was in the nuclear weapons industry, the history of its adverse effects 
on human beings is clouded in secrecy.9  For decades, the primary producer 
of beryllium, the Brush Wellman Corporation, and the primary user of 
beryllium, the federal defense agencies, attempted to belittle the health 
risks that beryllium posed to workers and neighbors of beryllium plants.10  
In their efforts to prevent OSHA and EPA from promulgating protective 
regulations limiting human exposure to beryllium, they took every 
opportunity to “manufacture uncertainty” about the science documenting 
the fact that exposure to beryllium caused lung cancer and a debilitating 
and usually fatal disease called chronic beryllium disease (CBD), or 
berylliosis.11
 
 7. See, e.g., Neil Pearce, Adverse Reactions, Social Responses: A Tale of Two Asthma 
Mortality Epidemics, in CONTESTED GROUND 57 (Peter Davis, ed. 1996) (noting that 
members of expert panel hired by manufacturer of fenoterol assembled at Beverly Wilshire 
Hotel in Beverly Hills for meeting). 
  The primary vehicle that Brush Wellman employed for this 
purpose was a blue ribbon panel called the Beryllium Industry Scientific 
 8. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Safety and Health 
Topics: Beryllium, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/beryllium/. 
 9. Sam Roe, Decades of Risk: U.S. Knowingly Allowed Workers to be Overexposed to 
Toxic Dust, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Roe, Decades of 
Risk]. 
 10. Sam Roe, Lethal Exposure: Brush Mislead Workers, Regulators about Dangers, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 1, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Roe, Lethal Exposure]. 
 11. David Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product, SCI. AM., June 2005, at 96; Roe, Decades 
of Risk, supra note 9, at A1. 
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Advisory Committee (BISAC). 
A. Beryllium Manufacture During the Cold War 
During World War II, the federal government entered into contracts with 
Brush’s predecessor and other companies to provide beryllium to several 
government-run laboratories associated with the Manhattan Project.12  As 
this massive effort proceeded ahead in complete secrecy, it became clear to 
government health officials that some small proportion of the workers who 
were exposed to beryllium dust in laboratories and fabrication plants were 
suffering from a debilitating lung disease that resulted in shortness of 
breath and ultimately death.13  When the officials recommended that the 
government take measures to reduce workplace exposures to beryllium, the 
federal facilities and some of their private contractors began to supply 
respirators to workers, but they took little additional action in the press to 
develop the atomic bomb for the war effort.14
Soon after the war ended, however, a secret report circulating within the 
newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) noted that the federal 
government was “acutely interested in maintaining and expanding 
production of beryllium.”
 
15  The report cautioned that if the incidence of 
berylliosis in workers became known outside the defense establishment, the 
outbreak “might be headlined, particularly in non-friendly papers, for 
weeks and months,” and this might in turn “seriously embarrass the AEC 
and reduce public confidence in the organization.”16  Rather than risk that 
embarrassment and a potential reduction in beryllium supplies, the AEC 
and its contractors decided to keep the incidence of berylliosis under 
wraps.17
After a 1943 outbreak of berylliosis among workers and neighbors of a 
beryllium plant in Lorain, Ohio threatened precisely the public relations 
fiasco that the AEC feared, it took steps to reduce exposures to beryllium at 
beryllium processing and weapons manufacturing plants throughout the 
country.
 
18
 
 12. Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 
  AEC scientists determined that neighbors should be exposed to 
no more than 0.01 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) in the ambient air, 
a number that became the very first federal ambient air quality standard 
9, at A1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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years before the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970.19  A workplace 
exposure standard was more difficult to promulgate, because it would have 
been impossible to limit exposures in some workplaces to 0.01 µg/m3 at a 
cost that government and industry officials were willing to pay at the 
time.20  The federal workplace limit of 2.0 µg/m3, established in 1949, 
grew out of a taxicab conversation between an AEC scientist and a medical 
consultant.21  That standard remains in place to this day.22
For the next twenty-five years, the original standards were enforced not 
through regulations backed up by civil and criminal penalties, but through 
clauses in the contracts between AEC and its successor agency, the 
Department of Energy (DOE), and the private government contractors.
 
23  
This posed a clear institutional conflict of interest, because the AEC and 
DOE were also responsible for ensuring a continuing supply of beryllium 
for the nuclear weapons arsenal.24  Indeed, the very same official was in 
charge of purchasing beryllium for the AEC and for enforcing the safety 
provisions in the purchase contracts.25  While this official faced very little 
pressure from uninformed workers and neighbors to ensure that the 
standards were not exceeded, he faced enormous pressure from the military 
to keep the beryllium supplies flowing.  When the AEC threatened during 
the 1960s to cancel one contract because of safety violations, a general 
called the relevant agency official to ask: “What are you, out of your 
goddamn-picking mind?  I’ve got submarines out there.  We need 
missiles.”26  The official soon left the agency to become a top executive at 
Brush Wellman.27
B. Beryllium Risks to Workers 
 
Although the government had established a 2.0 µg/m3 limit for worker 
exposure to beryllium, workers were routinely exposed to levels exceeding 
100 µg/m3 during the 1950s.28
 
 19. Id. 
  The owner of the primary manufacturing 
plant at the time, the Brush Beryllium Company, recognized that the 
 20. See id. 
 21. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98; Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 9, at A1. 
 22. The DOE issued a new role, reducing the acceptable workplace exposure level by a 
factor of ten.  Michaels, supra note 11, at 98. 
 23. Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 9, at A1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
MCGARITY_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:24 PM 
106 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
company was imposing health risks on its workers and that this could give 
rise to legal liability if the workers ever learned of those risks.29  A 
government document from the 1950s noted that Brush Beryllium 
Company attorneys were “in agreement that should negligence suits be 
brought against Brush in the future, the company would be in a very 
vulnerable position because it could be pointed out that evidence of 
overexposure was available and no direct action was taken to lower the 
exposures.”30
As the old beryllium plants were closed and replaced during the 1960s, 
the newer plants were designed to keep workplace exposures below the 2.0 
µg/m3 level, though this was not always accomplished.
 
31  By the mid-
1970s, however, evidence began to accumulate that beryllium causes lung 
cancer in human beings.32
C. OSHA Attempts to Set A Protective Standard. 
  Since there is no safe level of exposure to a 
carcinogen, the most effective way to protect workers is to set the standard 
as low as possible to reduce the cancer risk.  Additional controls, however, 
would have entailed large costs, and the industry therefore strongly resisted 
both the characterization of beryllium as a human carcinogen and attempts 
by OSHA and DOE to reduce allowable exposure levels. 
On October 14, 1975, OSHA proposed to promulgate a federal 
occupational health standard for beryllium that would reduce the existing 
standard of 2.0 µg/m3 to 1.0 µg/m3.33  OSHA based the proposal on its 
determinations that at least a dozen workers per year were being diagnosed 
with berylliosis and that beryllium had been shown to cause cancer in 
laboratory animals.34  It also relied on three controversial studies 
concluding that beryllium exposures caused cancer in workers at beryllium 
production plants.35  A criteria document prepared by OSHA’s sister 
agency, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), provided scientific support for OSHA’s rulemaking.36
The proposed rule took Brush Wellman officials completely by surprise, 
 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Occupational Exposure to Beryllium; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg.  
48,814, 48,817 (Oct. 17, 1975) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).  
 33. Id. at 48,814. 
 34. Id. at 48,816, 48,818. 
 35. Id.; see also Testimony of Edward U. Baier, Deputy Dir., Nat’l Inst. for 
Occupational Safety & Health, Ctr. for Disease Control, before the Occupational Safety & 
Health Admin. 3-4 (Aug. 19, 1977) (on file with author) [hereinafter Baier Testimony]. 
 36. Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4. 
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and they were not pleased.  Given the company’s close relationship with 
the Department of Energy (the entity now responsible for managing nuclear 
weapons contractors), they expected more advance notice.  The CEO of 
Brush Wellman told his lawyers that he was determined to fight the rule 
“with every weapon we had,” and he expected it to be the top priority both 
for his company and for the law firm that it hired.37  The company and its 
lawyers would challenge the legal basis for the proposal, but it would also 
attack the science underlying the agency’s conclusions and apply other 
“informal pressures” through its allies in Congress and the 
Administration.38
The rulemaking process culminated in a three-week formal hearing 
before a panel of OSHA officials in which attorneys from the agency, the 
company, and labor unions presented experts to testify and be cross-
examined on relevant scientific and engineering issues.
 
39  A witness for 
NIOSH testified that the evidence of beryllium’s carcinogenicity justified 
increasing the stringency of the standard to ensure that workers received 
the lowest feasible exposures.40  In the witness’s opinion, “[p]robably no 
compounds known to man give so consistent a carcinogenic response in so 
many animal species as do the compounds of beryllium.”41  Moreover, the 
fact that beryllium caused cancer at relatively low exposure levels in 
laboratory animals meant that beryllium compounds were “considered to be 
among the most potent carcinogens that have ever been tested in animals.42  
The NIOSH witness also relied upon human epidemiological studies 
conducted over several years by Dr. Thomas Mancuso and his colleagues 
and on a very recently completed study undertaken for NIOSH by David L. 
Bayliss and Joseph K. Wagoner, a special assistant to the Director of 
NIOSH.43  Relying on “the cumulative evidence presented,” NIOSH 
recommended that “beryllium be classified as a carcinogen.”44  Since “no 
safe level has yet been demonstrated for a carcinogen,” NIOSH 
recommended that “beryllium be controlled as low as possible in the 
industrial setting so as to materially reduce the risk of cancer.”45
To make its case on the scientific issues, Brush Wellman hired an 
 
 
 37. Sam Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1999, at A1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4. 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Deborah Shapley, Occupational Cancer: Government Challenged in Beryllium 
Proceeding, 198 SCIENCE 898, 898 (1977); Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3. 
 43. Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Id. 
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impressive array of witnesses, including Dr. Merril Eisenbud, a professor at 
New York University School of Medicine, and Dr. Brian MacMahon, a 
well-known epidemiologist at the Harvard School of Public Health.  They 
argued that the animal studies were by and large irrelevant, because they 
did not use the form of beryllium (beryllium copper) to which seventy 
percent of the workers were exposed.46  They were extremely critical of the 
epidemiological studies because an earlier version of the Bayliss and 
Wagoner study had found no increase in the incidence of lung cancer and 
because the more recent version of the study suffered from what they 
believed to be several serious flaws.47
A careful examination of the underlying data undertaken by industry 
consultants did reveal some information that tended to undermine the 
NIOSH authors’ conclusions.  In particular, thirty of the forty-six 
employees who died of lung cancer had been working at the beryllium 
plant for less than one year.  In the minds of the industry consultants, this 
was too brief an exposure to yield a credible conclusion concerning the 
capacity of beryllium to cause cancer in humans.
   
48  This was particularly 
evident in one of the lung cancer victims who was hired and terminated on 
the same day.49  They also criticized the authors’ failure to correct for age 
and smoking habits, two potentially serious confounding factors.50
D. The Industry Reacts 
 
Concluding that it was unlikely to prevail on the merits in the formal 
regulatory proceedings, Brush Wellman decided “that the only chance we 
had was to indict the government for bad faith.”51  A Brush spokesperson 
therefore charged that NIOSH had concealed information, abused its 
power, and generally treated the industry like “the enemy.”52  Through its 
public relations company, Brush convened a panel of eight scientists, six of 
whom were past or present company consultants,53 at the Cosmos Club in 
Washington, D.C. and asked them to draft a critique of the cancer studies 
upon which NIOSH and OSHA were relying.54
 
 46. Shapley, supra note 
  In an open letter to the 
42, at 898. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 899. 
 49. Id. at 901. 
 50. Id. at 899. 
 51. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Letter from Joseph Odorcich, Vice President, Safety & Health Dep’t, et al. to Joseph 
A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare and Hon. F. Ray Marshall, Sec’y of 
Labor 1 (Mar. 20, 1978) (on file with author). 
 54. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
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Secretaries of Labor and Health Education and Welfare (HEW), the 
scientists characterized the studies as “shocking examples of the shoddy 
scholarship and questionable objectivity utilized in making important 
national regulatory decisions.”55  The letter, which the public relations firm 
also sent to reporters and members of Congress, did not identify any of the 
authors as consultants for the beryllium industry and therefore did nothing 
to dispel the impression that it had been spontaneously generated by the 
outraged scientists.56
Two weeks after the scientists’ letter went out, Brush Wellman attached 
it to a letter to the Associate Director for Regulatory Policy and 
Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) urging him 
to “take appropriate action to correct this shocking exhibition of 
misconduct on the part of Federal regulators” and demanding that OMB 
“prevent any precipitous action by OSHA until this matter has been 
thoroughly reviewed and resolved.”
 
57  At roughly the same time, OSHA 
received letters from prominent senators and congresspersons demanding, 
among other things, a “truly independent review” of the science underlying 
OSHA’s position on beryllium’s carcinogenicity.58
The public relations assault had its intended effect.  Although the 
rulemaking record was complete, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
OSHA, Eula Bingham, wrote to HEW’s Assistant Secretary for Health, 
Donald Millar, to request that he convene a “group of senior governmental 
scientists to review all the epidemiological, clinical, and experimental data 
and provide us with an assessment that will help us resolve the issues” that 
the industry consultants had raised.
 
59  In her response to the letter written 
by the Cosmos Club group of scientists, she promised to “hold in abeyance 
the issuance of a final beryllium standard until we have received” 
comments from the government scientists.60
Thus, the government responded to the industry-appointed blue ribbon 
 
 
 55. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. Med. Ctr., et 
al. to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare and Hon. F. Ray Marshall, 
Sec’y of Labor 1 (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file with author). 
 56. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 57. Letter from Martin B. Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Wayne 
Grandquist, Assoc. Dir. for Regulatory Policy & Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 2 (Feb. 
24, 1978) (on file with author). 
 58. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1; Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, 
United States Senate to Hon. F. Ray Marshall, Sec’y of Labor 1 (Mar. 21, 1978) (on file 
with author). 
 59. Letter from Eula Bingham, Assistant Sec’y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 
to Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec’y for Health, Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare 1 (Mar. 
8, 1978) (on file with author). 
 60. Id. 
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panel of private sector scientists by proposing to empanel a blue ribbon 
panel of government scientists.  This solution was totally unacceptable to 
the industry, which objected to any “review being conducted by 
governmental scientists at the direction of the Department within which the 
studies were originally conducted.”61
With matters at an impasse, the leader of the Cosmos Club group, Dr. 
Merril Eisenbud, met with Dr. Millar to urge him to take the issue of 
beryllium’s carcinogenicity away from government officials and lawyers 
and give it to the scientists from both government and industry.  Dr. 
Eisenbud suggested that “the main issues could be resolved during a one-
day conference if the lawyers would stay on the sidelines.”
  The industry was understandably 
concerned that a blue ribbon panel composed of government scientists 
would lack sufficient objectivity.  It did not comment on the objectivity of 
the blue ribbon panel that it had convened at the Cosmos Club. 
62  He argued 
that “[t]he decisions should be reached by the scientific and technical 
representatives and the role of the lawyers should be limited to translating 
the decisions into the simplest possible memorandum of understanding that 
could serve as the basis for the OSHA standard.”63  He urged Millar to 
meet with a Brush Wellman vice-president to discuss co-sponsoring such a 
scientific meeting.64
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) had not played a significant 
role in the OSHA hearings, it became very interested in the outcome of the 
OSHA effort when DOD officials learned that one of the two national 
suppliers of beryllium, Brush Wellman’s competitor Kawecki Berylco 
Industries, might quit making beryllium, rather than comply with stringent 
OSHA standards.
 
65  A special DOD task force concluded that a decision by 
both companies to cease beryllium production would have serious national 
security implications.66  The government could, of course, pay for the 
improvements necessary to meet the OSHA standards through its contracts 
with the companies, but that would cost tens of millions of dollars, and the 
Department of Defense did not want to include that expense in its budget.67
 
 61. Letter from Patrick F. McCartan, Cousel for Brush Wellman, Inc. to Eula Bingham, 
Assistant Sec’y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 1 (Mar. 22, 1978) (on file with 
author). 
  
 62. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. to Dr. J. 
Donald Millar, Dir., Bureau of State Servs., Ctr. for Disease Control  1 (May 26, 1978) (on 
file with author). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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Instead, the task force asked the Secretary of Energy to attempt to 
“moderate” the OSHA proposal.68
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger then wrote to Secretary of Labor 
Ray Marshall and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph 
Califano to bring to their attention the fact that, “[t]he loss of beryllium 
production capability would seriously impact our ability to develop and 
produce weapons for the nuclear stockpile and, consequently, adversely 
affect our national security.”
 
69  Because “significant questions have been 
raised within the scientific community concerning the quality and adequacy 
of the data on which change of the standard is presently based,” DOE 
demanded an “independent peer review” of all available data on the effects 
of beryllium to address the adequacy of the present standard before issuing 
the proposed new standard.”70 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sent a 
similar letter to Marshall.71
Accepting Schlesinger’s recommendation, Secretary Califano then wrote 
the head of the Cosmos Club group, Dr. Merril Eisenbud, to tell him that 
that HEW would appoint “an outside group of scientists to review the 
experimental and epidemiological evidence.”
 
72  One of the other members 
of the Cosmos Club group wrote to Brush Wellman’s vice-president to 
congratulate him on this coup, noting that “Califano’s letter does [make it] 
look as if you have indeed stirred up a proper re-approach to the subject, 
especially with the appointment of an outside group of scientists to review 
things.”73
To Brush Wellman’s chagrin, the panel, which was chaired by 
University of North Carolina epidemiologist Dr. Carl Shy, found the 
science underlying the proposal to be of sufficient quality to justify 
regulatory action.
 
74
 
 68. Id. 
  The panel found that the existing animal studies were 
“credible in showing carcinogenicity of beryllium in at least two species” 
and that “the epidemiological evidence is suggestive that beryllium is a 
 69. Letter from James R. Schlesinger, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy to Hon. F. Ray Marshall, 
Sec’y of Labor 1 (Aug. 30, 1978) (on file with author). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 72. Letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare to Dr. Merril 
Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. 1 (Aug. 30, 1978) (on file with author). 
 73. Letter from Dr. H.S. VanOrdstrand, Dep’t of Pulmonary Disease to Martin B. 
Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. 1 (Sept. 6, 1978) (on file with author). 
 74. Letter from Dr. Carl M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina Med. 
Sch. to Dr. William H. Foege, Dir., Ctr. for Disease Control 1 (Oct. 12, 1978) (on file with 
author). 
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carcinogen in man.”75  The evidence was only “suggestive” because 
“alternative explanations for the positive findings” had not been 
definitively excluded and because the three recent papers that most 
indicated carcinogenicity still required “some revisions after journal peer 
review prior to publication.”76  Nevertheless, “it would be imprudent from 
a public health perspective to delay our judgment about beryllium exposure 
of current workers, until these studies were completed.”77
The letter precipitated a flurry of responses from members of the 
Cosmos Club group.  To a letter from Merril Eisenbud, Shy was 
deferential, but unrepentant.
 
78  Like Eisenbud, Shy was troubled by the fact 
that workers exposed for less than a year appeared to suffer cancer at a 
greater frequency than those who had been exposed for four years or 
more.79  Eisenbud’s letter had, however, helped clarify the matter by 
pointing out that many of the short-term exposure cancer victims had been 
exposed to the highest levels of beryllium during the uncontrolled period of 
the 1940’s.80  Some or all of these workers may have worked for only short 
periods because the high exposures made them acutely ill.81
In his letter to Dr. Shy, Cosmos Club group member Brian MacMahon 
was charitable toward the committee’s report, but warned that the 
committee may have been duped by the Bayliss-Wagoner paper.
 
82  Dr. 
MacMahon wrote that Shy’s comments on the paper “were reasonable 
enough but if you had any concept of the skullduggery that has gone on in 
the historical development of this paper I do not believe that you would 
have any confidence that the findings as now presented are reasonably 
error-free or that they result from an objective effort to ascertain the 
facts.”83
Dr. MacMahon’s innuendo was at least partially validated more than a 
year later when a dispute erupted between the authors of the Bayliss-
 
 
 75. Id. at 1-2. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Letter from Dr Dr. Carl M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina 
Med. Sch. to Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. 1 (Nov. 17, 1978) 
(on file with author). 
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 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Letter from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv. Univ. to Dr. Carl 
M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina Med. Sch. 1 (Feb. 13, 1979) (on 
file with author). 
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Wagoner paper.84  By the time that the study was published in the Journal 
of Environmental Research, its preparation had effectively been taken over 
by Wagoner and OSHA scientist Dr. Peter Infante.85  David Bayliss, who 
had worked on the study as a NIOSH employee but was by that time 
employed by the EPA, wrote to the head of the Centers for Disease Control 
on November 12, 1980, to complain that the final version of the study had 
been published without his approval or permission, despite the fact that he 
was listed as a co-author.86  Bayliss complained that the paper contained 
“several serious shortcomings” that other scientists had called to the 
authors’ attention but had not been corrected.87  Bayliss alleged that as Dr. 
Wagoner (his superior at NIOSH) became more involved in the preparation 
of the paper, it seemed increasingly “motivated . . . by a desire to provide 
evidence in support of the proposed OSHA standard and of the position 
advanced by OSHA that beryllium should be treated as a human 
carcinogen.”88  Bayliss believed that “there is now in the public domain a 
report attributed in part to me and bearing the apparent imprimatur of 
agencies of the United States government, which is at best misleading and 
by even the lowest common denominator of scientific standards should not 
be permitted to stand unchallenged in its present form.”89
The beryllium industry was delighted to hear that Bayliss had 
disassociated himself from the paper, and it made sure that the Bayliss 
letter was heavily publicized.
 
90  NIOSH officials, however, stood by the 
study as published and noted that it remained validated by the positive 
animal studies.91  In a letter to noted British epidemiologist Sir Richard 
Doll, New York University epidemiologist Norton Nelson said he believed 
some of Bayliss’ allegations, but had concluded that “the basic findings 
survive, leading to (generally) a conclusion of significant increases in lung 
cancer.”92
As the scientific controversy was brewing, the new owner of Kawecki 
 
 
 84. Letter from David L. Bayliss, Carcinogen Assessment Group, Envtl. Prot. Agency to 
Dr. William H. Foege, Dir., Ctr. for Disease Control 1 (Nov. 12, 1980)  (on file with 
author). 
 85. Id. at 1-2. 
 86. Id. at 2. 
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 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id. at 5. 
 90. R. Jeffrey Smith, Beryllium Report Disputed by Listed Author, 211 SCIENCE 556, 
556-57 (1981). 
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 92. Letter from Norton Nelson, Prof., New York Univ. Med. Ctr. to Sir Richard Doll, 
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Berylco decided to get out of the beryllium production business even 
without the impetus of a new OSHA standard.93  This left Brush 
Wellman as the government’s only domestic supplier of beryllium.94  
Operating from this very strong negotiating position, Brush Wellman 
entered into an agreement with the DOE under which it received a thirty-
five percent increase in the price that it charged for beryllium.  The DOE 
agreed not to work with other companies to develop an alternative 
supply of beryllium, and it promised to “exert its best efforts to convince 
OSHA to revise its proposed beryllium standard.”95
Although the negotiations took place at very high levels in the 
government, Dr. Bingham (the OSHA director) later recalled that the 
Department of Labor “got the message that the Department of Defense and 
Energy indicated that what was going forward caused a problem with 
national defense.”
 
96  To Bingham’s great disappointment, the Department 
of Labor in 1979 acceded to pressure from DOE and DOD and put the 
beryllium proposal on the back burner,97 where it has remained until this 
day.  Brush Wellman continued to produce beryllium at its aging plant 
where workers were frequently exposed to levels of beryllium that 
exceeded even the less stringent 2.0 µg/m3 OSHA standard.98
E. The Oxford Conference 
 
Although the OSHA threat disappeared, the scientific controversy did 
not.  The industry still faced the serious possibility that private and 
international standard-setting agencies would act on the accumulating 
scientific studies indicating that beryllium was a human carcinogen and 
that the aging 2.0 µg/m3 standard was not preventing workers from 
contracting berylliosis.  Not all of the processes that Brush Wellman 
employed were capable of meeting the 2 µg/m3 standard on a continuing 
basis, and scientists were increasingly expressing their doubts that the 
standard was stringent enough in any event.99
 
 93. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 
  If beryllium caused cancer, 
then a 2.0 µg/m3 standard was clearly not adequate to protect workers, and 
37, at A1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Proposal of Brush Wellman Inc. for Upgrading of Beryllium Metal Plant at Elmore, 
Ohio (1981) (on file with author); Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 96. Enric Volante & Rhonda Bodfield Sander, Protection for Workers Stymied by Firm, 
Allies, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 9, 1999, at A1. 
 97. Id.; Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 98. Roe, Death of a Safety Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1. 
 99. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Jere 
Brophy et al., Beryllium Supply to the Government 1 (Mar. 12, 1992) (on file with author). 
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the neighbors of beryllium plants were also at risk of contracting lung 
cancer.  Worst of all, once former workers, neighbors, and consumers of 
beryllium-containing products got wind of the fact that beryllium caused 
cancer, the company could expect “widespread litigation,” that would, in 
the words of a company attorney, lead to “a modern day gold rush.”100
Brush Wellman consultants therefore continued to closely monitor 
scientific developments involving beryllium.  In mid-1983, Dr. Brian 
MacMahon attended a conference at Oxford University hosted by 
preeminent epidemiologist Dr. Richard Doll.  Dr. MacMahon related to 
Brush Wellman that Gary Flamm of the FDA presented a paper on the 
animal evidence of beryllium carcinogenicity that, in MacMahon’s view, 
indicated “[w]ithout a doubt [that] it is the most powerful metallic cause of 
cancer.”
 
101  Dr. MacMahon further reported that a scientist from the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), an international 
standard-setting body associated with the World Health Organization, 
delivered a paper on the epidemiology of beryllium in which he concluded 
that “the single most likely explanation of the observations was that 
beryllium is carcinogenic in man,” though there were, of course, “other 
explanations.”102  MacMahon himself provided background on the 
Wagoner study (no longer associated with Bayliss), and he told the 
conference that NIOSH had concluded that the studies should be redone.103  
This almost produced an agreement to take beryllium off the meeting 
agenda altogether, but Dr. Doll “did not wish to go so far.”104  Instead, the 
participants agreed that any statement about beryllium would be “followed 
by a statement that because of the uncertainty as to the reliability of the 
epidemiologic data, the symposium did not wish to take a position relating 
to the epidemiologic evidence on beryllium.”105  Although the proceedings 
were supposed to be kept confidential until the formal papers were 
published, Dr. MacMahon could “see no particular reason” not to relate 
them to Brush Wellman’s vice-president, “[j]ust so [he didn’t] write to 
Richard Doll about it!”106
 
 100. Roe, Lethal Exposure, supra note 
  Brush Wellman’s interests were thus well 
served by Dr. MacMahon’s presence at the meeting. 
10, at A1. 
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Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. (July 13, 1983) (on file with author). 
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F. Challenging EPA’s Health Effects Document 
In the mid-1980s, a new agency entered the regulatory fray.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency prepared a health effects document for 
beryllium for the purpose of promulgating a hazardous emissions standard 
for companies, like Brush Wellman, that discharged beryllium compounds 
into the ambient air.107  Brush Wellman hired Neil Roth of Roth Associates 
to help coordinate the company’s response to EPA’s beryllium risk 
assessment.108  In early 1985, Roth reported that the document would be 
reviewed by a seven-member scientific panel assembled by EPA’s Science 
Advisory Board (SAB), and that the company would have a “receptive ear” 
in one of the members, Ron Wyzga, who worked for the power industry-
funded Electric Power Research Institute.109
In anticipation of a panel meeting in early June, Dr. MacMahon wrote to 
the Executive Secretary of the Environmental Health Committee of the 
SAB to express his views on the Draft Health Assessment Document.
 
110  
He believed that the section was “comprehensive, clear, well written and 
generally accurate,” except for the document’s reliance on the Wagoner 
epidemiology study.111  His problem was not that the data were 
“controversial,” but rather that they were “clearly wrong.”112  A second 
epidemiological study by Dr. Thomas Mancuso was afflicted by the same 
errors and uncertainties, but had been “less fully explored because of the 
investigator’s unwillingness to release [the underlying data].”113  Dr. 
MacMahon concluded that, “[i]n light of these errors and uncertainties, to 
base a human risk assessment on either of these two sets of data is, in my 
view, scientific malpractice—in the sense in which that term is used in 
clinical medicine.”114  Nowhere in the letter did MacMahon mention that 
he was a long-time paid consultant for Brush Wellman.115
In June 1985, Roth reported on conversations that he had with several 
 
 
 107. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 
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EPA employees subsequent to the SAB panel meeting.116  David Bayliss, 
who now worked for EPA’s carcinogen assessment group (CAG), reported 
to Roth that the panel had endorsed the document.117  The CAG planned to 
perform some additional calculations using different latency periods and 
thereafter finalize the document.118  It did not plan to address MacMahon’s 
criticisms in any comprehensive way.119  Ron Wyzga, the industry ally on 
the panel, was surprised to hear from Roth of CAG’s response, and he 
agreed to submit “specific recommendations on what he expects from 
them.”120  Roth reported that as a result of his efforts, “[a]t a minimum 
Ron’s comments will force them to obtain and process the latest NIOSH 
life table program or ask us to do it.  Knowing Dave Bayliss, this will take 
him years to do.”121
As Roth predicted, in September of 1985, the SAB advised the 
Administrator of EPA that “the draft document merits revision on several 
critical points.”
 
122  The Committee agreed with CAG that beryllium was “a 
carcinogen for animal species,” but asserted that the animal studies that 
were appropriate for quantitative risk assessment purposes “lead to 
estimates which are inconsistent with the expectations from human 
epidemiological studies.”123  As for the epidemiological studies, the 
document demonstrated a “thorough understanding of the problems and 
questions embedded in these data,” but “[m]any of the confounding factors 
that the draft document discusses have quantitative implications that have 
not been made explicit in the risk calculations.”124  The agency staff should 
therefore “calculate the quantitative implications of these confounding 
factors.”125  This was, of course, exactly the reaction that Roth had 
predicted.126
By communicating his conversation with CAG member Bayliss to panel 
member Wyzga, industry consultant Roth ensured that CAG would not be 
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able to disregard the critique of industry consultant MacMahon, thereby 
ensuring that a final version of the Health Assessment Document (and any 
subsequently promulgated regulatory requirements) would not be 
forthcoming for years. 
G. The BISAC 
At a two-day meeting in 1986, Brush Wellman officials hit upon a plan 
to shape the evolving science to fit the company’s benign view of the 
hazards that beryllium posed to workers.127  One critical component of that 
plan was to formalize the Cosmos Club group into an entity called the 
Beryllium Industry Scientific Advisory Committee (BISAC).128  Like the 
Cosmos Club group, BISAC was chaired by Dr. Merril Eisenbud, and it 
included the most active members of the Cosmos Club, Dr. Brian 
MacMahon and Dr. Adrianne Rogers, a colleague of Dr. MacMahon at the 
Harvard School of Public Health.129  The final scientist to join BISAC was 
Dr. Paul Kotin, a well-known toxicologist who had been the first director 
of the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences and was later 
the senior medical officer for the Johns Manville Corporation, a prominent 
United States manufacturer of asbestos products.130  Dr. Thomas Markham, 
Brush Wellman’s medical director, rounded out the five-member 
committee.  Its Executive Director was long-time Brush Wellman 
occupational health specialist Martin Powers.131
The reconstituted committee held its inaugural meeting on October 8, 
1990 at the Cosmos Club,
 
132 and it met at least twice a year thereafter.  The 
members were paid two thousand dollars each, plus travel expenses,133 but 
individual members also served as consultants to Brush Wellman.  Over the 
next decade Brush Wellmon contributed more than one million dollars to 
support BISAC’s activities.134  According to its charter, one of the 
purposes of the committee was to “develop and implement a strategy to 
address .  .  .  the perception of beryllium as a human carcinogen.”135
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internal company document suggested that the committee would “provide 
the scientific basis for our cancer strategy.”136
1. Testing for CBD 
  Two other issues also 
dominated BISAC’s deliberations: (1) the curious resurgence of Chronic 
Beryllium Disease (CBD) at Brush Wellman plants years after Brush 
Wellman scientists had concluded that the 2.0 µg/m3 standard had all but 
eradicated the disease; and (2) the intriguing possibility of reducing the 
incidence of CBD by screening susceptible workers out of the workplace 
through genetic testing. 
At its July 1991 meeting, BISAC agreed to convene a workshop aimed 
at standardizing protocols for a more sensitive probe for berylliosis called 
LTT testing.137  Later that year, the committee met with representatives of 
the DOE and other beryllium users, and they agreed “that two meetings 
were in order.”138  The first would be a workshop “to quickly develop 
protocols for testing, analysis and follow-up,” and the second would be “a 
more comprehensive conference . . . to assess the meaning of the data 
generated and the efficacy of the programs to that date.”139  The workshop, 
which was held in February of 1992 in Washington, D.C.,140 was attended 
by representatives of the relevant government agencies, the beryllium 
industry, the United Steelworkers Union, and one nonprofit worker 
advocacy group.141  Although the participants discussed the pros and cons 
of establishing a “national database for the consolidation of all beryllium 
LTT,” the group did not reach a consensus on that question.142  The 
industry representatives were concerned that DOE’s screening efforts were 
“proceeding at a pace that could be summarized as ‘too much, too fast,’” 
but the representatives of the labor unions disputed this characterization.143  
At the next BISAC meeting, the committee concluded that DOE was not 
likely to heed industry concerns that the LTT testing program was “too 
ambitious in both scope and speed of execution.”144
Given that the LTT screening was likely to go forward despite its 
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reservations, BISAC provided its input on what information from the 
screening program should be communicated to Brush Wellman 
employees.145  Early reports from one hundred seventy-two employees that 
had been tested at one of Brush Wellman’s plant indicated that five of the 
tests were abnormal and four were considered “borderline.”146  At the other 
plant, eight of one hundred forty-four were abnormal and five were 
borderline.147  Of the eight abnormal tests at the first plant, three cases had 
been confirmed and five were being re-tested.148  Although the abnormal 
and borderline cases were of sufficient importance, the committee was 
interested in the breakdown, and the members agreed that “in order to 
avoid undue anxiety on the part of the employee, employee notification 
should be confined to confirmed cases.”149
By July of 1992, the National Institute for Environmental and Health 
Science (NIEHS) had agreed to join BISAC and the DOE in sponsoring the 
suggested international conference, but it was not clear that it would be 
limited to CBD.
 
150  In a letter to his counterpart at DOE, the BISAC 
Chairman strongly recommended that the conference not take up the 
question of the carcinogenicity of beryllium.151  By January of 1993, 
however, a tentative agenda for the meeting indicated that the entire second 
day would be devoted to carcinogenicity-related issues.152  BISAC then 
concluded that it would not sponsor the meeting after all.153
2. The Genetics of CBD 
 
BISAC understood that “[i]f techniques could be developed to determine 
whether an individual is predisposed to CBD it might be possible to 
prevent the disease by pre-employment screening.”154  The committee 
therefore supported the work of Italian scientist Cesare Saltini, who also 
did work at Johns Hopkins University.  In early 1991, BISAC decided to 
devote fifty thousand dollars to Saltini’s work.155
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five-year strategic plan projected that the company would support Dr. 
Saltini’s research at a level of thirty thousand dollars per year for the next 
three years.156  In a letter soliciting monetary support for BISAC from 
other companies manufacturing and using beryllium, Brush Wellman’s 
vice-president for environmental and governmental affairs noted BISAC’s 
role in sponsoring Dr. Saltini’s research and stressed that it “should lead to 
tests which will allow pre-screening of people who are sensitive to 
beryllium.”157
As Dr. Saltini’s work continued to show promising results, BISAC 
invited him to attend the committee’s April 1993 meeting along with 
representatives from labor unions, DOE, EPA, OSHA, and other beryllium 
companies.
 
158  At the meeting, a labor representative expressed “concern 
about the confidentiality aspects of genetic information and the potential 
for abuse of the data generated.”159  Labor would “be cautious in agreeing 
to its use for screening purposes.”160  At a subsequent meeting, however, 
the BISAC members agreed that “attempts to stop scientific research for 
fear of its misuse at some later date were inappropriate as well as 
unrealistic.”161  The group congratulated itself for providing the “seed 
money” that stimulated research programs on this topic by Dr. Saltini and 
Dr. Rossman of the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center.162
Unfortunately, neither scientist succeeded in identifying a “magic bullet” 
gene indicating increased susceptibility to CBD, and by late 1996, Dr. 
Eisenbud urged Brush Wellman to abandon that line of work.
 
163  At a 
January 1999 meeting, BISAC concluded that “[e]thical and legal questions 
involving confidentiality versus medical consideration of disease 
prevention leave no clear course of action to be taken at this time.”164
3. Attacking the Science on Carcinogenicity 
 
A Health, Safety, and Environmental Strategic Plan presented to the 
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Brush Wellman Board of Directors on June 25, 1991 outlined strategies for 
dealing with anticipated new scientific information on beryllium’s toxicity, 
one of which was to “[c]hallenge unscientific or unreasonable regulations, 
studies or other government actions.”165  Among other things, Brush 
Wellman would dispute the upcoming revised NIOSH cancer study, 
challenge an anticipated air quality carcinogen standard by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration, challenge EPA’s upcoming drinking water 
standard for beryllium, and challenge an upcoming EPA quantitative risk 
assessment.166
The updated NIOSH study, now under the supervision of Dr. Elizabeth 
Ward and Dr. Andrea Okun, reaffirmed Dr. Wagoner’s earlier conclusion 
that workplace exposure to beryllium caused cancer in human beings.
 
167  
At its July 11, 1991 meeting, the BISAC reviewed the still unpublished 
Ward & Okun study and concluded that it “provided no basis for 
identifying beryllium as a carcinogen.”168  Dr. MacMahon agreed to 
prepare a statement to that effect.169  The committee also suggested that the 
industry should suggest that “an international panel of beryllium experts be 
convened to address all pertinent beryllium health issues.”170
A week later, Brush Wellman’s President and CEO, Gordon D. Harnett, 
issued an ultimatum to Dr. J. Donald Millar, the head of NIOSH.
 
171  
According to Harnett, Brush Wellman had reanalyzed the new Ward & 
Okun data and concluded that “when appropriately adjusted for smoking 
and geographic location,” the results “retain no statistical significance.”172  
Harnett demanded that NIOSH give the company “adequate advance notice 
of the publication journal” so that Brush Wellman could “contact the editor 
and request publication of our rebuttal in the same issue.”173  The CEO 
warned that the dispute over the revised study was “fast approaching a 
situation painfully reminiscent of that of the late 1970’s with its 
acrimonious public debate over the scientific objectivity and competence of 
NIOSH studies,”174
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primarily by Brush Wellman consultants now sitting on BISAC.  Brush 
Wellman did not need to remind NIOSH that the outcome of that debate 
was that OSHA put aside its proposed workplace standard and that NIOSH 
backed away from the earlier conclusions of its scientists.  Brush 
Wellman’s CEO now warned NIOSH that publication of the Ward & Okun 
conclusions, “with no more scientific support than is in the study, would be 
difficult to explain short of a malicious effort to harm the industry.”175
By October 1991, a study conducted by Dr. Kyle Steenland concluding 
that beryllium caused cancer in workers had been published in the Journal 
of the National Cancer Institute.
 
176  In an April 1992 communication to 
BISAC, Harnett stated that “the ‘cancer cloud’ that hung over the company 
was a very serious problem” and that he “hoped the Committee would soon 
see its way clear to address it.”177  This overture was consistent with the 
company’s desire to “[d]evelop a long-term strategy through BISAC which 
will place the cancer issue in proper perspective.”178
The “cancer cloud” darkened somewhat when Dr. Rogers reported to 
BISAC that a recent study showing that airborne beryllium caused lung 
cancer in rats had, in her view, been adequately conducted.
 
179  Although 
Brush Wellman had taken the position in the OSHA hearings and 
elsewhere that the older animal studies were of unacceptable quality, Dr. 
Rogers asserted that “these studies had to be seriously regarded.”180  By 
July, however, the committee had come up with a response to the animal 
studies.  Rather than “debate whether beryllium is or is not an animal 
carcinogen,” it was determined that the industry should demand that “the 
question be addressed on a material by material basis, i.e., ore, soluble 
salts, compounds, alloys, metal, etc., and examine the relevance of each to 
human cancer.”181
 
 175. Id. 
  This strategy had the virtue of putting the burden on the 
government to test each of the materials in laboratory animals or explain 
why the results of tests of one form of beryllium were relevant to human 
exposures to a different form.  The committee recommended that a seminar 
be convened to examine the relevance of animal tests to human beings and 
 176. Kyle Steenland & Elizabeth Ward, Lung Cancer Incidence Among Patients with 
Beryllium Disease: A Cohort Morality Study, 83 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1380, 1380-85 
(1991). 
 177. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with the author). 
 178. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Bob 
Rozek, Vice President, Brush Wellman Inc., re: Environmental and Governmental Affairs 2 
(June 19, 1992) (on file with author). 
 179. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 4 (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with the author). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 7 (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with author). 
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related matters.182
Another discouraging development for the industry was the decision by 
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to review its 
monograph on metals at its February 1993 meeting.
 
183  IARC was an 
agency of the World Health Organization (WHO), the primary health-
oriented research arm of the United Nations, and its monographs were 
highly influential with regulatory bodies and private standard-setting 
agencies throughout the world.184  Brush Wellman, however, considered 
IARC to be an “enemy” of industry.185  The current monograph for metals 
characterized beryllium as a “Class IIA probable human carcinogen,” but 
there was a significant likelihood that IARC would upgrade that 
classification to “Class I known human carcinogen,”186
IARC had invited Euromateaux, a European trade association, to send a 
participant to the meeting, and Euromateaux had in turn agreed to allow 
Brush Wellman to select that participant.
 and this could spell 
disaster for the industry. 
187  Understanding that the IARC 
meeting was “extremely important to the beryllium industry” and that the 
focus of the meeting was likely to be on the epidemiological studies, 
BISAC concluded that it would be best to specify BISAC member Dr. 
Brian MacMahon as the industry representative.188  Dr. MacMahon agreed 
to have his name put forward, “with the caveat that if health or other 
considerations dictated, he would withdraw from the commitment.”189  
Euromateaux then recommended Dr. MacMahon for the position.190
As it happened, Dr. MacMahon could not make the IARC meeting, and 
Dr. Kotin attended in his stead.
 
191  As predicted, “the ultimate classification 
of beryllium was virtually entirely dependent on epidemiological 
considerations.”192
 
 182. Id. at 7. 
  Dr. Kotin was incensed with what he believed to be 
 183. Memorandum from Linda Duffy to Joel Moskowitz et al., re: January 22 BCDA 
Meeting Trip Report 2-3 (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file with author). 
 184. International Agency for Research on Cancer, http://www.iarc.fr (last visited Apr. 
12, 2006). 
 185. Memorandum from Linda Duffy to Joel Moskowitz et al., supra note 183, at 2. 
 186. Id. at 3. 
 187. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 7 (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with the author). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
 190. Memorandum from Arlette Shagarofsky-Tummers to Members of the Dangerous 
Substances and Dangerous Preparations Coordination Groups et al. (Aug. 3, 1992) (on file 
with author). 
 191. Memorandum from Dr. Paul Kotin to Martin B. Powers, Executive Sec’y, BISAC 1 
(Mar. 1, 1993) (on file with author). 
 192. Id. 
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“the obvious ‘a priori’ commitment of Dr. Carl Shy, as Chairman of the 
Epidemiology Subgroup to use whatever methods necessary that would 
result in beryllium being placed in IARC Group I.”193  Kotin believed that 
“Dr. Shy behaved egregiously as chairman by his obvious partiality to 
Group I status for beryllium in both his comments and meeting 
deportment.”194  Dr. Shy had written the first draft of the IARC 
epidemiology document with the help of Dr. Steenland, his colleague at the 
University of North Carolina, and author of the most recent 
epidemiological study, and he defended it throughout.  Dr. Kotin later 
admitted that his own input had “an element of industry advocacy,”195 but 
it was to no avail.  A majority of the IARC group voted to elevate 
beryllium to Class I status.196
Concerned that the Ward & Okun and Steenland papers might soon be 
used for regulatory purposes, Dr. MacMahon told BISAC that he would 
redouble his efforts to prepare a review article critiquing those studies and 
the earlier NIOSH studies.
 
197  He completed his paper five months later, 
and it was accepted for publication in the Journal of Occupational 
Medicine.198  The article concluded that “the small and inconsistent excess 
of lung cancer deaths in employees of one or two plants seen in [the Ward 
& Okun and Steenland] studies are compatible with a number of 
explanations other than that they are attributable to occupational exposure 
to beryllium.”199  Indeed, it stated that “confounding by cigarette smoking 
is a more likely explanation of the lung cancer excess than is occupational 
exposure to beryllium compounds.”200  Dr. Kotin wrote a lead editorial for 
the issue strongly supporting Dr. MacMahon’s assessment.201
 
 193. Id. 
  Dr. Kotin 
complained that government agencies had in the past used “unconfirmed or 
noncritically reviewed data” in promulgating regulations, and he argued 
 194. Id. at 2. 
 195. Roe, Thought Control, supra note 127, at A1. 
 196. Memorandum from Dr. Paul Kotin to Martin B. Powers, Executive Sec’y, BISAC, 
supra note 191, at 3. 
 197. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 1 (Apr. 8, 1993) (on file with author). 
 198. Letter to Elizabeth Popper from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv. 
Univ. (Sept. 23, 1993) (on file with author).  The paper acknowledged that it had been 
written at the request, and through funding from BISAC, which he characterized as “an 
independent committee supported by the Brush Wellman and NGK Metals Companies.”  
Brian MacMahon, The Epidemiologic Evidence on the Carcinogenicity of Beryllium in 
Humans, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 15, 15 (1994). 
 199. MacMahon, supra note 198, at 15. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Paul Kotin, Re: The Epidemiological Evidence on the Carcinogenicity of Beryllium, 
by MacMahon, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 25, 25 (1994). 
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that the statutory “prudence” requirement that ordinarily applied to 
regulatory agencies did “not eliminate the requirement for validity of the 
data on which actions are based.”202
As discussed in connection with BISAC’s consideration of LTT 
screening, the international conference that BISAC envisioned for that 
issue had by January 1993 been co-opted to some extent by the NIEHS, 
which had insisted that the second day of the conference be devoted to 
beryllium’s carcinogenicity.
  Despite the fact that the IARC panel 
and the peer reviewers for the journals in which they were published had 
accepted the Ward & Okun and Steenland studies, the unspoken 
implication of Dr. Kotin’s editorial was that it would be inappropriate for 
OSHA or EPA to rely on those studies in light of Dr. MacMahon’s 
conclusion that they were flawed. 
203  Although BISAC had decided not to co-
sponsor the conference, it remained very concerned with the content of the 
second day’s presentations.204  In a November 1, 1993 letter to NIOSH, 
BISAC committee chairman Merril Eisenbud complained that NIEHS had 
“not budged from its plan to include only two interrelated papers” (the 
Ward & Okun and Steenland papers) in the session devoted to the cancer 
epidemiological studies.205  In particular, the session would apparently not 
include an independent presentation of Dr. MacMahon’s article.206  
Eisenbud accused NIOSH of attempting to “perpetuate the adversarial 
positions on the subject of the human carcinogenicity of beryllium that 
have existed for many years, and with which the conference would have 
been in a position to deal in a constructive way.”207
In 1994, Brush Wellman decided to undertake some empirical work of 
its own, not on the cancer histories of its workers, but on the history of the 
Lorain, Ohio plant from which Drs. Ward and Okun and Steenland had 
gathered their data.
 
208  Dr. Dimitrious Trichopoulos, a Harvard School of 
Public Health epidemiologist who replaced Dr. MacMahon on BISAC in 
January of 1994, suggested that the excess cancers at the Loraine plant 
might be explained by some factor unique to the processes that were 
employed at that plant.209
 
 202. Id. 
  This would be good news for Brush Wellman, 
 203. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Chairman, BIASC to Dr. C.W. Jameson, Nat’l Inst. 
of Envtl. Health Sci. 1 (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with author). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 2. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Letter from Dr. Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Prof., Harvard Sch. of Public Health to 
Mark Kolanz, Director EH&S, Brush Wellman, Inc. 4 (June 24, 1999) (on file with author). 
 209. Id. 
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because the Lorain plant had operated only from 1936 to 1948, when it was 
destroyed by fire.210  If the cause of the cancer was uniquely related to a 
process employed at the abandoned Lorain plant, and if more recently 
constructed plants did not employ that process, then Brush might still be 
subject to a few workers compensation claims, but it would not have to 
worry about tightening exposure standards beyond the historical 2.0 µg/m3 
standard at its current plants.211  It could also avoid future liability to 
workers at plants using Brush Wellman’s finished beryllium and to 
consumers claiming that they had contracted cancer from products 
containing beryllium.212
Brush Wellman asked a retired engineer and a retired metallurgist, both 
of whom had helped design and run the Lorain plant, to examine the 
possibility that the workers at the Lorain plant were exposed to some 
substance that was unique to that plant.
 
213  They soon reported back that 
the gas-fired rotary kiln used at the Lorain plant would have emitted 
sulfuric acid mists and that one of them had spoken to a friend who 
believed that the kiln would have been “a perfect acid-mist generator.”214  
This was useful to Brush Wellman for two reasons: (1) sulfuric acid mist 
exposures had been associated with lung cancer in past epidemiological 
studies, and (2) none of the other more recently constructed beryllium 
plants used acid-fired rotary kilns.215
In a memo to the BISAC, Brush Wellman’s vice-president for 
governmental and environmental affairs suggested three projects.
  In other words, this seemed to be 
precisely the sort of unique process that Dr. Trichopoulos had hoped to 
find. 
216  First, 
Dr. Trichopoulos should provide a preliminary opinion as to whether the 
sulfuric acid mist theory was “plausible.”217  Second, the committee should 
review the IARC monograph on magenta, which had employed a process 
theory similar to Dr. Trichopoulos’ suggestion, to “look for clues as to how 
the arguments were framed.”218
 
 210. Id. 
  Third, BISAC should “have a 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Dr. 
Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. et al., re: What Was Unique About 
the Processing of Beryllium Materials in the Brush-Lorain Plant? 1 (Jan. 31, 1994) (on file 
with author). 
 214. Id. at 2. 
215 Id. 
 216. Id. at 3. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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knowledgeable chemical engineer model and analyze the Lorain 
calcinations process, looking for support of the opinion” of the two retired 
employees.219  Brush Wellman hoped that this preliminary work could be 
completed and conveyed to a NIOSH group at a March meeting that was to 
be devoted to discussing whether workers at beryllium plants should be 
notified about the cancer risks they faced.220  Although Brush Wellman did 
not “expect to change [the NIOSH group’s] minds on their study results, it 
will hopefully create some doubt.”221
At the NIOSH meeting, Drs. Kotin and Trichopoulos placed the new 
theory front and center, stressing that the “[t]he data clearly pointed to the 
uniqueness of the Lorain Plant” and that the “excess of cancer” detected in 
the Ward & Okun and Steenland studies “clearly had the fingerprint of 
cancer caused by acid mist.”
 
222  Consequently, any notification to workers 
concerning cancer risks “should be directed only to that population.”223  
Not surprisingly, representatives of NIOSH and organized labor disagreed.  
NIOSH “rejected the notion that acid mists were a plausible explanation of 
the cancer excess,” and it stressed that the absence of excess cancer at the 
more recently constructed facilities was more likely attributable to the long 
latency period between exposure and onset of cancer.224  In the end, 
however, the participants “reached a compromise that was probably better 
than [the industry representatives] expected.”225  The notification letter to 
employees would include specific information about individual facilities 
and “note the disagreement among scientists about the carcinogenicity of 
beryllium.”226
The Brush Wellman effort to focus attention on acid mists continued in 
1995 when it assembled a team of engineers to “reconstruct the Lorain 
Plant, the processes, the products, the throughput, and the conditions that 
existed in that plant during its life.”
  Thus, the uncertainty that BISAC manufactured found its 
way into the NIOSH communication to the workers at Brush Wellman’s 
plants. 
227
 
 219. Id. 
  This paper exercise was completed 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Bob 
Rozek, Brush Wellman, Inc., re: NIOSH worker Notification Meeting 1 (Mar. 14, 1994) (on 
file with author). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 2. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Letter from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Dr. Dimitrious 
Trichopoulos, Chairman, Harvard Sch. of Public Med. 1 (Apr. 18, 1995). 
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in April, and it “paint[ed] a picture of a plant that had ventilation that was 
barely adequate to control the acid fumes to the level of tolerance of the 
employees, but sufficiently inadequate to cause the employees to avoid the 
sulfating mill, if at all possible.”228  Brush Wellman then sought guidance 
from Dr. Trichopoulos “as to the information you feel would be necessary 
to back up your story.”229  Brush’s vice-president for governmental and 
environmental affairs believed that there was “ample evidence to 
differentiate the processes in the Lorain Plant,” and he hoped that Dr. 
Trichopoulos would “find this information as exciting as we do.”230
At a subsequent BISAC meeting, Dr. Trichopoulos reported that he had 
evaluated the engineering report and concluded that the sulfuric acid levels 
suggested in the report were too high for human endurance.
 
231  He made 
some slightly different assumptions and “drafted a summary for Brush 
review and concurrence.”232  At BISAC’s January 1996 meeting, Dr. 
Trichopoulos noted that the conclusions of IARC and NIOSH would be 
“extremely difficult to change, given the normal human tendency to 
perpetuate error rather than admit to it.”233  The acid mist paper, however, 
would give “everyone a chance to correct the error without losing face if 
they were willing to do so.”234  The committee agreed that the paper was of 
sufficient importance that it should be sent to the Journal of Occupational 
and Environmental Medicine “with the entire BISAC listed as authors.”235
Things progressed precisely as planned, and the acid mist paper was 
published in the March 1997 issue of that publication.
 
236  The article began 
with a description of the IARC program for evaluating carcinogenicity in 
humans and the 1992 IARC evaluation of beryllium.237  It then related Dr. 
MacMahon’s earlier review article citing “serious defects in the 
methodology of the early epidemiologic studies” and questioning “the 
interpretation of the more recent, and generally better grounded, 
epidemiologic studies.”238
 
 228. Id. at 2. 
  Noting that “[s]ulfuric acid mist and vapors are 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 4 (Oct. 9-10, 1995) (on file with author). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 5 (May 20, 1996) (on file with author). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Haberman & Pratt et al., Is Beryllium Carcinogenic in Humans?, 39 J OCCUP. 
ENVTL. MED. 205, 205-08 (1997) (written by the members of BISAC). 
 237. Id. at 205. 
 238. Haberman & Pratt, et al., Is Beyrillium Carcinogenic In Humans?, supra note 236, 
at 205. 
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established lung carcinogens in humans,” the paper concluded that “the 
process and circumstances at the Lorain plant were probably carcinogenic 
to humans” and that the “apparent effect of ‘beryllium and beryllium 
compounds’ was the result of exposure to sulfuric acid mist and vapors that 
acted as typical confounding variables.”239
H. The Government Takes a Modest Step 
 
One of the goals of Brush Wellman’s 1991 five-year plan was to “insure 
that the Company is protected, through competent defense, from 
unwarranted legal and regulatory actions related to [environmental health 
and safety] issues.”240  To meet that goal in the regulatory arena, the 
company would “[e]mploy legal means to defeat unreasonably restrictive 
occupational and emission standards and to challenge rulemaking and other 
regulatory activities that seek to impose unreasonable or unwarranted 
changes.”241  Apparently any change from the existing forty year-old 
occupational standard of 2.0 µg/m3 was deemed by the company to be 
“unreasonable” because another 1991 goal was to “[r]esist an attempt to 
make the existing occupational exposure standard of 2 micrograms/cubic 
meter, as measured and calculated by Brush, more restrictive.”242
During the latter half of the Clinton Administration, however, the DOE 
decided that it had an obligation to protect workers at DOE-related 
facilities even if there were some scientific uncertainties about the need to 
take any particular action.
  With the 
help of BISAC, the company succeeded in forestalling regulation for the 
better part of a decade. 
243  On December 8, 1999, DOE issued a rule 
applicable to workers at facilities managed by DOE and its contractors 
mandating a ten-fold reduction in the acceptable workplace exposure to 
beryllium.244  In 1998, OSHA added to its regulatory agenda a new project 
under which it would consider whether to require that companies in the 
private sector implement the same protections,245 but the project was not 
completed during the remainder of the Clinton Administration.246
 
 239. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added).  
  In 2002, 
 240. Rozek, supra note 156, at 1, Tab 5(f). 
 241. Id. at 2, Tab 5(f). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98. 
 244. Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,854, 68,862 (Dec. 
8, 1999). 
 245. Occupational Exposure to Beryllium; Request for Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,707, 
70,709 (Nov. 26, 2002). 
 246. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98. 
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the Bush Administration announced that OSHA would not propose a 
beryllium standard until further research had been completed, and it 
requested public comment on fifty-two questions that it thought would be 
relevant to its decision whether or not to go forward with a rulemaking 
effort.247
III. BLUE RIBBON PANELS AND SOUND REGULATORY DECISION 
MAKING. 
  The agency has taken no formal action since that time. 
Brush Wellmon’s decision to appoint a “blue ribbon panel” of carefully 
chosen experts is a frequently relied upon industry response to the 
publication of an adverse scientific report or a worrisome regulatory 
development.  If there was an unusual aspect to BISAC, it was its 
longevity.  Because it is expensive to assemble several busy experts at a 
commodious location, pay them consultant fees or honoraria for their 
efforts, and provide staffing for the meetings and reports, most blue ribbon 
panels are assembled for a specific regulatory need and dismissed as soon 
as that task has been completed.  If, however, an industry’s products or 
activities are likely to prove controversial on a continuing basis, it can 
assemble a permanent panel of experts to provide advice to the industry 
and relevant regulatory agencies as the beryllium industry did with BISAC. 
The cosmetics industry in 1976 created a similar quasi-permanent panel 
of seven experts called the Expert Panel for Cosmetic Ingredient Review 
(CIR) to address post-market studies indicating that cosmetics might be 
dangerous.  CIR was then available to address a controversy that erupted in 
2002 over the use of phthalates in nail polishes, shampoos, fragrances and 
similar products after laboratory animal research suggested that many 
phthalates can cause birth defects.248  The CIR unanimously concluded that 
phthalates were “safe for use in cosmetic products in present practices of 
use and concentration.”249  Coming just twelve days after the European 
Commission (EU) ordered companies to remove two phthalates from 
cosmetics sold in EU countries,250 an industry spokesperson declared the 
CIR finding to be a “triumph for science-based evidence over scare 
tactics.”251
 
 247. Occupational Exposure to Beyryllium; Request for Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 70, 
709. 
 
 248. Jim Morris, FDA Scrutinizing Family of Chemicals, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 
17, 2002, at A1; Brian Reid, Beauty Coverage?, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at F1. 
 249. Glenn Hess, CIR Panel Finds Phthalates Safe for Cosmetics Applications, 262 
CHEMICAL MARKET REP. 1, 1 (2002). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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The primary advantage of the blue ribbon panel to the government is its 
capacity to bring scientific expertise to bear on policy-relevant scientific 
issues.  As discussed above, government agencies often find the considered 
judgment of a group of prominent scientists helpful in determining the 
reliability and quality of scientific studies.  Blue ribbon panels also perform 
the perhaps less legitimate function of deflecting public criticism from 
agencies that are forced to make tough decisions.  As Professor Wendy 
Wagner has demonstrated, agencies are all too willing in such situations to 
engage in a “science charade,” through which they mask controversial 
policy decisions in the veneer of science and thereby avoid accountability 
for their policy choices.252
The usefulness of a privately assembled blue ribbon panel to the 
government is less clear when the relevant agency has already initiated a 
scientific review procedure.  For example, while EPA’s Science Advisory 
Board was reviewing a draft of a staff-prepared assessment of the health 
risks posed by exposure to the Teflon precursor PFOA,
  Privately arranged blue ribbon panels can 
provide the same scientific input and political cover at no cost to the 
government. 
253 the industry-
funded American Council on Science and Health (ACSH) hastily 
assembled a blue ribbon panel composed of an entirely different group of 
scientists.  That panel produced a booklet and accompanying press release, 
based upon an industry-prepared position paper that was “peer reviewed” 
by scientists likewise chosen by ACSH.254  The ACSH panel concluded 
that PFOA posed “no likely risk” to humans in the “trace amounts” found 
in human blood.255
From the perspective of a regulated entity, the blue ribbon panel has the 
great virtue of lending scientific legitimacy to what would otherwise be 
viewed as mere advocacy.  The views of company scientists will 
predictably be dismissed as biased by participants who disagree with the 
company’s position on the regulatory issues, and they are likely to be 
  The resort to a press release, however, suggests that the 
panel’s purpose had less to do with providing an objective scientific 
assessment to the agency than with preempting the contribution of the 
experts that the agency had already assembled. 
 
 252. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 1, at 1640. 
 253. See EPA, OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, DRAFT RISK ASSESSMENT OF 
THE POTENTIAL HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO 
PERFLUOROOCTANOIC ACID AND ITS SALTS (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/pfoa/pfoaex.pdf. 
 254. Teflon-Production Chemical Does Not Pose Health Risk to General Population, 
Science Panel Finds, MED. NEWS TODAY, Mar. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=21512. 
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discounted by the agency for the same reason.  Agency officials may 
legitimately suspect that company scientists are not entirely free to express 
their scientific judgment when it leads to conclusions that run counter to 
the company’s economic well-being.  The views of the distinguished 
scientists that make up a blue ribbon panel are less easily dismissed, 
because they typically have a degree of financial independence and are 
presumably less likely to risk damage to their reputations in the pursuit of a 
single company’s economic interests. 
As the BISAC and CIR examples suggest, the privately sponsored blue 
ribbon panel is an especially useful device for “deconstructing” one or 
more scientific studies that could, if relied upon by regulatory authorities, 
threaten the economic well-being of a company or industry.  If, as is 
typically the case, the blue ribbon panel includes prominent scientists with 
established reputations in the relevant field, their criticisms of work 
undertaken by government scientists or less well-established scientists can 
carry a great deal of weight both in the scientific community and, more 
importantly, among high level regulatory decision makers.  For example, in 
the mid-1990s, a consultant to the chlorine industry assembled a group of 
eighteen scientists at a commodious location to evaluate a nine-volume 
draft EPA assessment of the human health risks of dioxin.256  The meeting 
resulted in a letter signed by all of the assembled scientists and published in 
Science expressing serious reservations about the quality of the science 
underlying the risk assessment.257  Although one of the participants later 
acknowledged that the consulting company may not have been “unbiased 
in the choice of individuals it . . . brought together” to evaluate the risk 
assessment,258
The blue ribbon panel can also prove useful in an industry’s broader 
attempts to influence pubic opinion.  An effective public relations 
campaign may generate pressure on a regulatory agency against taking 
“precipitous” action, and it may also be necessary for more mundane 
marketing purposes when a company’s product comes under attack.  As the 
phthalates example suggests, a rapid scientific rebuttal to a study indicating 
that a product poses risks to human health may be required to restore 
 high level agency officials sent the draft back to the drawing 
board where it remained for another six years until the agency issued a 
“revised draft” for review. 
 
 256. Dioxin and the EPA: The Science and Politics of Regulation, ENVTL. REV. 
NEWSLETTER (Envtl. Rev., Seattle, WA), May 1995, available at 
http://www.environmentalreview.org/vol02/mattison.html; Richard Stone, Dioxin Report 
Faces Scientific Gauntlet, 265 SCIENCE 1650, 1650 (1994). 
 257. Dioxin and the EPA: The Science and Politics of Regulation, supra note 256. 
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shaken consumer confidence in the product.  It is therefore not surprising 
that public relations firms are frequently involved in assembling and 
managing blue ribbon panels.  The public relations people use the blue 
ribbon panel to “manufacture uncertainty” about the validity of the 
damaging studies.  In the messy world of regulatory science where 
perfection is impossible, the scientists on the blue ribbon panel can be 
relied upon to identify one or more aspects of virtually any study that could 
stand improvement.  The public relations professionals then take over to 
characterize the study as “fatally flawed” and therefore unworthy of serious 
consideration by consumers, agencies and courts. 
For example, in the early 1990s, the EPA prepared a risk assessment on 
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and presented it to the agency’s 
Science Advisory Board for review.259  Although EPA lacked any 
regulatory authority on its own to regulate indoor air quality, the tobacco 
industry recognized that the document posed a serious threat to the vitality 
of the industry if the public became convinced that secondhand smoke 
caused lung cancer.260  RJR Tobacco Company therefore hired a consultant 
to assemble a “shadow committee” of “independent scientists,” formally 
called the “EPA Health Assessment Review Committee,” to evaluate 
EPA’s risk assessment and be available at the behest of the company’s 
public relations department to discuss relevant issues at regulatory, 
administrative, legislative, and other public forums.261  The committee 
prepared a lengthy critique of the EPA document, concluding that, “EPA’s 
classification of ETS as a Group A carcinogen is scientifically not 
justifiable.”262
Professor Neil Pierce notes that a company’s selection “of a few 
scientists who are hypercritical of others’ work can result in massive 
pressure on public health decision makers” that is “particularly effective 
since it apparently comes from independent scientists.”
 
263
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almost exclusively from the diminishing ranks of climate change critics, to 
evaluate a report by the 2,500 member International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).  The Marshall Institute panel’s report, which predictably 
criticized the IPCC for “failing to convey the underlying uncertainties that 
are important in policy considerations,”264 was then relied upon by Senator 
James Inhofe to support his intense criticism of scientists who advocate 
taking action to reduce greenhouse gasses.265
As Professor Pierce suggests, the primary danger of the industry-
appointed blue ribbon panel to the integrity of the regulatory decision-
making process is it obvious potential for bias.  The company that convenes 
the panel can choose its members, and it is likely to consider past 
statements, publications and other indicia of a member’s policy 
predilections in going about that task.  Even if every invited scientist is not 
dependably in the sponsor’s camp, the sponsor knows that, as a practical 
matter, “whoever drafts the original document effectively controls the 
message.”
 
266
There is certainly evidence that blue ribbon panels do not always adopt a 
wholly neutral approach to the scientific evidence.  For example, when the 
reproductive toxicity of low-level exposures to the ubiquitous plasticizer 
Bisphenol A (BPA) threatened its continued use, the plastics industry hired 
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis to assemble a scientific panel to 
address that question.
  The important thing, therefore, is to ensure that the 
chairperson and a solid majority of the members of the committee are 
likely to support the sponsor’s position. 
267  While acknowledging that several studies had 
reported adverse reproductive effects in laboratory animals, the panel found 
no “consistent affirmative evidence of low-dose BPA effects.”268  Critics 
pointed out, however, that the panel reviewed seven of the nine industry-
funded studies (all of which found no adverse effects) and only twelve of 
the thirty-eight available government-funded studies (nearly all of which 
identified some adverse effect at low levels).269
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the publication of the first paper detailing the serious side effects of the 
sleeping pill Halcion in The Lancet, the pill’s manufacturer convened a 
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group of sleep researchers who sent a letter to the journal denouncing the 
study.270  The chairperson of the group later acknowledged that he and the 
other researchers had been mislead by company representatives.271
After the manufacturer of the asthma drug fenoterol sharply criticized an 
epidemiological study published in The Lancet concluding that the drug 
caused increased mortality in asthmatics, the author conducted a second 
study to meet the manufacturer’s objections.
 
272  When the second study 
reached the same conclusion, the manufacturer convened a group of 
carefully chosen experts at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills, 
California to evaluate the second study’s conclusions.273  Working “under 
some pressure” from the company’s public relations representative, the 
group concluded that the second study avoided only one of the 
methodologic problems of the first study, but had “retained others and 
introduced new methodologic problems.”274  An independent review of the 
second study convened by the FDA, however, concluded that both studies 
supported the conclusion that fenoterol caused increased mortality, and the 
agency ultimately took steps to minimize the use of the drug.275
An industry can deflect allegations that a blue ribbon panel was “hand 
picked” by contracting with an outside organization that will reliably 
assemble a group that is dominated by scientists of the right persuasion.  
For example, after EPA proposed the establishment of a stringent standard 
for chloroform in drinking water, the chlorine industry arranged with the 
International Life Science’s Institute, an industry-supported think tank, to 
assemble a blue ribbon panel to evaluate the carcinogenic risks of 
chloroform.
 
276  The panel disagreed with EPA’s zero parts per billion 
maximum contaminant level goal for chloroform in drinking water and 
suggested a much less stringent goal of three hundred parts per billion.277  
Similarly, the American Council for Science and Health, at the behest of 
the plastics industry, convened a “blue ribbon panel” headed by former 
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to evaluate the health risks and benefits 
of the plasticizer DEHP, a common component of medical devices.278
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panel concluded that DEHP was not harmful to human health and that 
banning it from medical devices would pose a significant health risk to 
people in need of those devices.279
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The numerous examples of privately commissioned blue ribbon panels 
reaching conclusions consistent with the sponsoring entity’s position, and 
the dearth of examples of such panels reaching conclusions that undermine 
the sponsoring entity’s position (the author has not located a single one, 
though it is entirely possible that one or more examples do exist), probably 
explains why regulated industries find these panels to be an effective, if 
expensive way to influence regulatory decision making and public 
perceptions about potentially risky products and activities.  From the 
perspective of sound public policy, however, the critical question is 
whether the value to the decision-making process of the additional 
expertise and information that the blue ribbon panel makes available is 
outweighed by its potential to bias regulatory decisions in the direction of 
the positions of the sponsoring entities. 
The easiest way for regulatory agencies to prevent bias from intruding 
into the process is to ignore the output of such panels altogether.  Agencies 
could simply let it be known that reports from privately commissioned blue 
ribbon panels are so unreliable that they are not appropriate for citation in 
comments to the agency or in any agency support document.  This extreme 
solution, however, is unworkable as a practical matter, and generally 
inconsistent with sound regulatory decision making.  As a practical matter, 
sponsoring entities will still assemble blue ribbon panels to influence 
consumers and legislators, and an agency that adamantly refuses to 
acknowledge their reports is an easy target for severe public criticism by 
the sponsoring and their entities allies in think tanks and legislatures.  As a 
scientific matter, a wholesale “exclusionary rule” is inconsistent with the 
“weight of the evidence” approach that scientists normally take toward 
evaluating the reliability of scientific information.280
The better solution is for the agency itself to take a “weight of the 
evidence” approach toward blue ribbon panel reports, and to discount them 
sufficiently to avoid bias.  Sometimes this will merely require agency 
decision makers to take the blue ribbon panel’s report “with a grain of 
salt.”  Sometimes, as with the case of blue ribbon panels dominated by 
scientists known to be on the extreme fringe of the relevant scientific issue 
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(e.g., the Marshall Institute’s global warming panel), this will require the 
agency to discount the panel’s predictable conclusions quite deeply.  
Furthermore, when an agency cites in support of a regulatory decision the 
conclusions of an outside blue ribbon panel that was supported by an entity 
with an interest in the outcome of the proceedings, it should provide its 
reasons for concluding that the panel’s conclusions were objective and 
otherwise reliable. 
Since the origin of and support for an outside blue ribbon panel will not 
always be obvious to the agency (or members of the general public), the 
agency should attempt to ascertain the identity of any sponsoring entity 
prior to relying upon the conclusions of such panels.  In the case of some 
panels, like BISAC, the sponsoring entity is readily apparent.  For others, 
like panels convened by intermediate entities such as the International Life 
Sciences Institute, identifying the real source of the panel’s support may be 
difficult.  In either case, full disclosure of the source of support is critical to 
the agency’s evaluation of the panel’s conclusions and to the public’s 
ultimate acceptance of the agency’s decisions. 
Although it should be reasonably easy for a regulatory agency to identify 
and discount biased input from privately sponsored blue ribbon scientific 
panels, the general public may be mislead by the sophisticated public 
relations campaigns that sponsoring entities and their public relations 
consultants initiated.  An agency may be hard-pressed to explain to the 
public why it is reaching a regulatory decision that appears to depart from 
the advice of a panel composed of scientists with prestigious pedigrees.  A 
relatively expensive way to fend off public pressure generated by a blue 
ribbon panel is for the agency to appoint its own panel.  As we have seen, 
the regulated industries are not above generating “dueling panels” when the 
stakes are sufficiently high.  This solution, however, invites the agency to 
engage in the same kind of biased cherry-picking exercise in assembling 
the agency’s panel that the private entity no doubt used to assembling its 
panel, thus inviting deserved criticism of the decision-making process for 
lack of objectivity. 
One might hope that the scientific community would rally in defense of 
an agency that has become the target a well-financed campaign by a 
regulated entity to “manufacture uncertainty” through biased blue ribbon 
panels, but that is likely a vain hope.  Scientists are cautious by nature and 
therefore not inclined to wade into public controversies.281
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on an issue of profound public importance like global warming, agencies 
should not depend upon independent scientists to come to their defense in 
run-of-the-mill disputes over the quality of scientific studies, and the proper 
inferences to be drawn from those studies.  The relatively mundane field of 
“regulatory science” is not likely to inspire many scientists to abandon their 
laboratories for the talk radio circuits. 
At the end of the day, the agency may be forced to rely upon its own 
ability to influence public perception and on the willingness of the 
beneficiaries of the regulatory statutes it implements to come to its defense 
in the public relations wars.  Unlike the scientific community generally, 
scientists employed by advocacy groups are willing and able to speak out 
on scientific issues that arise in regulatory contexts, and they are usually 
adept at attracting the attention of the news media.  Although public 
interest groups lack the resources to assemble blue ribbon panels to 
deliberate at length and write reports, they can generate letters to agencies 
and congresspersons and ask prominent scientists to sign them.  While this 
may not be an adequate substitute for the reasoned deliberation of a blue 
ribbon panel in the scientific community, it may prove quite persuasive in 
the realm of public relations. 
Blue ribbon panels assembled by governmental bodies have contributed 
greatly to sound regulatory decision making.  Like any policymaking tool, 
however, the blue ribbon panel has both virtues and limitations.  It can, 
among other things, be misused by regulatory agencies to mask 
policymaking behind the veneer of scientific objectivity.  In the hands of 
private entities with their own agendas, the blue ribbon panel concept has 
fewer virtues and more limitations.  Because they are expensive, private 
entities will rely upon them when they feel most threatened by a scientific 
development or regulatory initiative.  The motivation is self-defense, and 
not the advancement of scientific knowledge.  Because they have such a 
high potential for mischief, agencies should not encourage their use and 
should view their products with a highly skeptical eye. 
 
